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Cole: Cole: Refreshed Recollection of Witnesses Prior to Testimony:

Refreshed Recollection of Witnesses
Prior to Testimony: Certainty Stands
Strong in Missouri State Courts
State ex rel. Polytech, Inc. v. Voorhees'
I. INTRODUCTION
Under Missouri common law, "awitness need not produce a document
used to refresh recollection before testifying."2 Although federal courts
follow a discretionary rule 3 -granting judges latitude as to which memoryrefreshing documents a witness must disclose to avoid injustice-Missouri's
high court has followed a more certain nondisclosure rule. This Note
examines the development of Missouri's rule as well as the policy arguments
for the Missouri and federal rules, in the context of State ex rel. Polytech, Inc.
v. Voorhees,4 the recent Missouri Supreme Court case that reaffirmed
Missouri's refreshed recollection rule.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Polytech, Inc., sued Sedgwick James of Missouri, Inc., Polytech's
insurance broker, for failure to secure adequate insurance.' In preparation for
possible litigation, Polytech's counsel requested that Douglas Hazel, one of
Polytech's officers, summarize his involvement with Sedgwick.6 At
deposition, Hazel admitted authoring, and forwarding to counsel, a one page
summary of his intercourse with Sedgwick.7 Further, Hazel acknowledged
that he reviewed this summary prior to his deposition.8
Sedgwick requested Hazel's summary.9 Polytech refused, claiming
attorney-client privilege and work product immunity." Since Polytech's
counsel used the summary to prepare Hazel for deposition, Sedgwick sought

1. 895 S.W.2d 13 (Mo. 1995).

2. Id. at 14; State v. Scott, 467 S.W.2d 851, 853 (Mo. 1971); State v. Smith, 431
S.W.2d 74, 82 (Mo. 1968); State v. Crayton, 354 S.W.2d 834, 837-38 (Mo. 1962).
3. See FED. R. EviD. 612.
4. 895 S.W.2d 13 (Mo. 1995).
5. id.

6. Id.
7. id.

8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 13-14.
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an order compelling disclosure" from Circuit Judge Alphonso H.
Voorhees. 2 Voorhees ordered disclosure of Hazel's summary, 13 and
Polytech sought a writ of prohibition from the court of appeals, which was
denied. 4 Polytech then petitioned for a writ of prohibition from the
Missouri Supreme Court.'In a unanimous decision, written by Judge Duane Benton, the court
reaffirmed the traditional Missouri rule that "a witness need not produce a
document used to refresh recollection before testifying," and the writ of
prohibition was made absolute. 6
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The use of a writing to refresh a witness's recollection was recognized
by English courts as early as 1660.'" Courts in the United States began
following the English rule in 1817."8 Though several jurisdictions have
it is now well settled in all
struggled with the issue in the past,'
jurisdictions that writings may be used to refresh a witness's memory.2"
However, when a document is claimed to be protected by the attorney-client
privilege or work product immunity, and is used to refresh recollection prior
to testifying, the federal rule often conflicts with state rules. 2 This is the
case in Missouri.'

11. Id. at 13.
12. Id. at 13-14. The Honorable Alphonso H. Voorhees serves on the Circuit
Court of St. Louis County and was the respondent in Polytech's petition for a writ of
prohibition. Id.
13. Id. at 14.
14. Id
15. Id.
16. Id at 14-15 (citing Mo. CONST. art. V § 4).
17. See 3 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN

SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 735 (Chadbourn rev. 1970).

18. Id. (citing Pearson v. Wightman, I Mill's Const. Ct. 336, 344 (S.C.L. 1817)
(where a witness to a will refreshed his recollection by identifying his handwriting)).
19. Wigmore gives a detailed summary of the "confused and perplexing"

precedents that defined the course of the use of writings to refresh a witness's
recollection in Pennsylvania, New York, Massachusetts and Illinois. Id. at § 736.
20. 3 WIGMORE, supra note 17, § 736.
21. See 3 WIGMORE, supra note 17, at 140 n.4 for a list of other jurisdictions

following the Missouri rule.
22. Polytech, 895 S.W.2d at 13-14.
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A. The Federal Rule
In federal courts, the rule analogous to Missouri's refreshed recollection
rule is Federal Rule of Evidence 612. Originally promulgated in 1975, this
rule provides that an adverse party has a right to inspect a writing used by a
witness to refresh recollection while testifying or before testifying.'
Under the federal rule, if the writing is used to refresh memory while
testifying, the adverse party is entitled to inspect the writing regardless of any
claim of attorney-client privilege or work product immunity.2" If a writing
is used to refresh a witness's memory before testifying, the court must use its
discretion to determine if production is required to serve the "interests of
justice. " '
The proponents of codification of the federal rules-as well as those
arguing that states should follow the federal lead and codify rules of
evidence-believed that doing so would benefit the bar in several ways.
Proponents argued that adopting the federal rules would increase the
competence of the bar through greater familiarity with the rules; establish
uniformity and predictability throughout the courts; increase efficiency and
decrease cost of litigation; and would lead to better decisions because more
evidence would be accessible to the trier and the judge would have greater
discretion.26 On the other hand, the opponents to codification argued that
this can generate neither uniformity nor predictability. 7 Nonetheless, after

23. See FED. R. EVID. 612, which provides in pertinent part:
Except as otherwise provided in criminal proceedings . . ., if a witness uses
a writing to refresh memory for the purpose of testifying, either(1) while testifying, or
(2) before testifying, if the court in its discretion determines it is
necessary in the interests of justice,
an adverse party is entitled to have the writing produced at the hearing, to

inspect it, to cross-examine the witness thereon, and to introduce in
evidence those portions which relate to the testimony of the witness.
24. FED. R. EvID. 612.
25. Id.
26. See generallyMargaret A. Berger, The FederalRules ofEvidence: Defining

and Refining the Goals of Codification, 12 HOFSTRA L. REV. 255, 256-57 (1984);
House Comm. on the Judiciary, Notes on the Federal Rules of Evidence, 4
U.S.C.C.A.N. 7075, 7075-77 (1974); Thomas J. Green, Reporter for the Special
Committee on Evidence, Judicial Conference of the United States, A Preliminary
Report on the Advisability and Feasibility of Developing Uniform Rules of Evidence
for the UnitedStates DistrictCourts, 30 F.R.D. 73, 109-10 (Feb. 1962).
27. See, e.g., John H. Wigmore, The American Law Institute Code of Evidence
Rules: A Dissent,28 A.B.A. J. 23, 24 (1942).
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decades of such debates the federal rules were signed into law on January 2,
1975, becoming effective on July 1, 1975.28

As written, the rules are extremely flexible, setting forth general
standards, rather than concrete rules of law. 29 Rule 612 is no exception. Its
clause allowing a judge to permit inspection of a writing used to refresh a
witness's memory before testifying-if, in the judge's opinion, it is necessary
to avoid an injustice-effectively codifies nothing. Within several years of
the Rules' codification, commentators began calling for a reassessment of
some of the rules that grant discretion to judges.3'

B. Synthesis of Missouri'sRule
As early as 1874, Missouri courts allowed the use of writings to refresh
a witness's memory.3 2 Before the turn of the century, in Traber v. Hicks,33
the Missouri Supreme Court recognized-in order to ensure that a witness
"testify from his own knowledge, and not from information obtained from
others" 3 4-the right of an adverse party to inspect a writing "to test its
sufficiency for the purpose used."35 Though Traber seems, at first glance,
to be contrary to the current Missouri rule, its "test of sufficiency" is the
foundation of the current rule, which delineates whether the writing is
consulted during testimony or prior to giving testimony.36

28. Berger, supranote 26, at 256-57, 277 n.6 (citing Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L.
No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926, codified at 28 U.S.C. App. 1976 & Supp. V 1981)).
29. Berger, supranote 26, at 255. Though much of the pre-promulgation debate
centered on providing uniformity and guidance, the rules as adopted are far from
predictable. Even the rule stating the purpose of the rules is ambiguous. See FED. R.
EVID. 102, "Purpose and Construction," which provides:
These rules shall be construed to secure fairness in administration,
elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay, and promotion of growth
and development of the law of evidence to the end that the truth may be
ascertained and proceedings justly determined.
30. FED. R. EVID. 612.
31. See, e.g., Berger, supra note 26, at 276.

32. See Smith v. Beattie, 57 Mo. 281, 283 (1874).
33. 32 S.W. 445 (Mo. 1895).
34. Id. at 447.
35. Id. In Traber,a witness testified to facts gleaned from refreshing his memory
with the writings of another. It appears that the witness had no personal knowledge
of the facts in the writing at the time of its composition. Since such testimony is in
no sense a refreshed recollection, the court deemed that, in order to test the writing's
sufficiency for the purpose used-refreshing the witness's memory-the adverse party
had a right to inspect the writing. Id.
36. Cf State v. Miller, 368 S.W.2d 353, 356-57 (Mo. 1963); State v. Gadwood,
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol61/iss3/5

4

1996]

Cole: Cole: Refreshed Recollection of Witnesses Prior to Testimony:
REFRESHED RECOLLECTION

When a document is used to refresh a witness's memory during
testimony, opposing counsel may inspect the document to substantiate whether
the testimony is in fact a reflection of the witness's memory or merely
regurgitation of what is seen in the document. 7 However, when a document
is used to refresh a witness's memory prior to giving testimony, the testimony
is based on recollection, and not merely a recitation of the contents of "notes
in hand."38 In either case, it is the memory of the witness that is evidence,
not the writing that is consulted.39
State v. Crayton0 effectively synthesizes the foundational cases that
developed the Missouri Rule. In Crayton, the court stated that:
[t]he purport of the Missouri cases seems to be that [opposing] counsel
should be permitted to examine a paper or document from which [the]
witness has refreshed his recollection while on the stand... but that this
is not required where the [paper] is not produced and used at the trial,
although it may have been examined by the witness previously.4
Several more recent Missouri Supreme Court cases followed this rule;42
however, the rule came into question when the Eastern District Court of
Appeals handed down its opinion in Barrettv. Mummert.43
In Barrett, the court stated that the traditional rule, then most recently
stated by the Missouri Supreme Court in State v. Scott,' had been
"impliedly" overruled45 by the court's decision in Callahan v. Cardinal
Glennon Hospital.46

116 S.W.2d 42, 50-51 (Mo. 1938); State v. Tracy, 243 S.W.2d 173 (Mo. 1922); State
v. Patton, 164 S.W. 223, 225-26 (Mo. 1914); State v. Miller, 137 S.W. 887, 890 (Mo.
1911); Bova v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 316 S.W.2d 140, 146 (Mo. Ct. App. 1958);
State v. Jackson, 194 S.W. 1078, 1078 (Mo. Ct. App. 1917); State v. Nardini, 186
S.W. 557, 557 (Mo. Ct. App. 1916).
37. Tracy, 243 S.W.2d at 175-76; Patton 164 S.W. at 225-26; State v. Miller, 137
S.W. at 887, 890 (Mo. 1911).
38. See State v. Miller, 368 S.W.2d 353, 356-57 (Mo. 1963); Gadwood, 116
S.W.2d at 50-51; Bova, 316 S.W.2d at 146; Jackson, 194 S.W. at 1078.
39. Patton, 164 S.W.2d at 226.
40. 354 S.W.2d 834 (Mo. 1962).
41. Id. at 838.
42. See State v. Scott, 467 S.W.2d 851, 853 (Mo. 1971); and State v. Smith, 431
S.W.2d 74, 81-82 (Mo. 1968).
43. 869 S.W.2d 282 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994).
44. 467 S.W.2d 851, 852-53 (Mo. 1971).
45. Barrett, 869 S.W.2d at 284-85.
46. 863 S.W.2d 852 (Mo. 1993).
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In Callahan, the court found "no error or prejudice resulted" from the
trial court giving opposing counsel a document used by a witness to refresh
recollection prior to testifying.47 However, the court's observation that "no
error or prejudice resulted," comes just one paragraph before the court's caveat
that: "in cases of ... prejudicial evidence or other improper incidents in the
course of a trial ... absent a manifest abuse of that discretion [the Missouri
Supreme Court] should not interfere."48 Nonetheless, the court of appeals,
in Barrett,read an implied overruling of Missouri's refreshed recollection rule
into Callahan, upon which Judge Voorhees relied.49
IV. THE INSTANT DECISION
In State ex rel. Polytech, Inc. v. Voorhees,5" the Missouri Supreme
Court's opinion reaffirmed Missouri's common law rule that "a witness need
not produce a document used to refresh recollection before testifying."'"
After outlining the facts leading to Judge Voorhees's order for Polytech to
produce a document used to refresh a witness's memory prior to testifying,52
the opinion began by stating that "[w]here disclosure of 'privileged material'
is alleged, prohibition is available, since an erroneous disclosure 'cannot be
repaired on appeal."' 53 Next, the opinion summarized why the document in
question falls within Missouri's attorney-client privilege.
The court explained that "[t]he attorney-client privilege protects
'confidential communications . . . between an attorney and . . . client'

concerning representation of the client."55 "The privilege may be invoked by
either the attorney or the client, though it exists for the benefit of the
client."5 6
"A corporate manager is a 'client' for purposes of the
privilege."57 Since, in this case, one of Polytech's officers wrote and

47. Id. at 868.
48. Id. (citing Hoene v. Associated Dry Goods Corp., 487 S.W.2d 479, 485 (Mo.
1972)).
49. State ex rel. Polytech, Inc. v. Voorhees, 895 S.W.2d 13, 14 (Mo. 1995).
50. 895 S.W.2d 13 (Mo. 1995).
51. Id. at 14.
52. Id. at 13-14.

53. Id. at 14 (citing State ex reL Peabody Coal Co. v. Clark, 863 S.W.2d 604,
608-09 (Mo. 1993); Mo. Sup. CT. R. 84.22(a)).
54.
55.
S.W.2d
56.

Id. at 14.
Id. (citing State ex reL Terminal R.R. Ass'n of St. Louis v. Flynn, 257
69, 73 (Mo. 1953) (en banc)).
Id. (citing State exrel. Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Smith, 574 S.W.2d 379, 385 n.6

(Mo. 1978) (en banc)).
57. Id. (citing State ex rel. Pitts v. Roberts, 875 S.W.2d 200, 202 (Mo. 1993)).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol61/iss3/5
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delivered a summary of his interaction with the defendant to Polytech's
counsel and no one except the officer and Polytech's counsel viewed the
summary, the court concluded that the document was protected by the
attorney-client privilege. 8 The opinion next discussed Missouri's work
product doctrine. 9
The court observed that "[tihe work product doctrine protects the
'thoughts' and 'mental processes' of the attorney preparing the case," ' and
"[w]ork product includes documents prepared in anticipation of litigation."6
As both Polytech's officer and counsel stated that the summary at issue was
prepared in anticipation of future litigation, the court concluded that the
document qualified as work product. 2
Next, the opinion reviewed Judge Voorhees's argument that, since
Polytech's officer reviewed the document for his deposition, Polytech waived
both the attorney-client and work product privileges.' In the remainder of
the opinion, Judge Benton compared the policy arguments for the traditional
Missouri rule-prohibiting a discretionary standard and thus advancing
attorney-client and work product privileges-to the uncertain and discretionary
The opinion ended by overruling Barrett v.
rule in federal court.'
6
Mummer and State ex. rel. McCulloch v. Lasky to the extent that these
cases recognized any abrogation of the traditional Missouri rule.6
The court unanimously made the writ of prohibition absolute; thus, Judge
Voorhees could not order Polytech to disclose the document. 8

58. Id.
59. Id
60. Id.(citing State ex rel. Terminal R.R. Ass'n of St. Louis v. Flynn, 257
S.W.2d 69, 73 (Mo. 1953)).

61. Id (citing Mo. SuP. CT. R. 56(b)(3)).
(citing Friedman v. Provaznik, 668 S.W.2d 76, 80 (Mo. 1984) (quoting
62. Id.
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 505 (1947))).
63. The opinion points out that Judge Voorhees based his decision on the recent
Missouri Eastern District Court of Appeals case of Barrett v. Mummert, 869 S.W.2d
282 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994), which held that the Missouri Supreme Court had, in
Callahan v. Cardinal Glennon Hospital, 863 S.W.2d 852 (Mo. 1993), "impliedly
approved" a requirement that documents used to refresh recollection before testifying
be disclosed. Polytech, 895 S.W.2d at 14.
at 14-15; see supra note 23 for the pertinent test of the analogous federal
64. Id.
rule, FED. R. EVID. 612.
65. 869 S.W.2d 282 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994).
66. 867 S.W.2d 697 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993).
67. Polytech, 895 S.W.2d at 14-15.
68. Id at 15.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1996
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V. COMMENT

In Polytech, the Missouri Supreme Court favored a well-reasoned
doctrine over the discretion of any particular judge on any particular day. By
following the well-established Missouri rule, the court makes clear that the
certainty and administrability of the attorney-client privilege and work product
doctrine, as they have developed in Missouri, will not soon fall prey to a
discretionary standard plagued by a lack of steadfastness.
The traditional Missouri rule, that "a witness need not produce a
document used to refresh recollection before testifying,"69 has survived for
good reason. As observed by Judge Benton in Polytech, the Missouri rule
"advances attorney-client and work product privileges by prohibiting
discretionary disclosure."7 ° This is true. However, the opinion does not
elaborate on the reasons why these privileges are advanced.7
The Missouri refreshed recollection rule provides certainty to judges,
lawyers and litigants. Under the Missouri rule, judges do not have discretion
72
to compel disclosure of pre-testimony recollection-refreshing documents.
This is a practical rule that is easy to understand. When preparing a case for
litigation in Missouri's state courts, lawyers can freely solicit information from
their clients and can plan strategy and prepare their case without having to
face the uncertainty of possible disclosure.73
The federal rule is far less certain.74 The federal rule analogous to
Missouri's refreshed recollection rule, Federal Rule of Evidence 612," allows
ajudge to compel disclosure of memory-refreshing documents "if the court in
its discretion determines it is necessary in the interests of justice ... ,76 In
regard to discretionary rules of evidence, Wigmore wrote that "large areas of
'discretion' [will cause] the Law of Evidence [to] suffer, not a reform, but a
relapse into that primal condition described in Genesis 1:2, when the Earth
'was without form and void. ' '7 7 Though this is a bit of an exaggeration,

69. Id. at 14 (citing State v. Scott, 467 S.W.2d 851, 853 (Mo. 1971); State v.
Smith, 431 S.W.2d 74,82 (Mo. 1968); Statev. Crayton, 354 S.W.2d 834, 837-38 (Mo.
1962)).
70. Id. at 15.

71. Id.
72. Polytech, 895 S.W.2d at 14-15.
73. See Polytech, 895 S.W.2d at 15; Ettie Ward, The Litigator's Dilemma:
Waiver of Core Work Product Used in TrialPreparation,62 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 515

(1988).
74. See infra note 78 and accompanying text.
75. See supranote 23 for the pertinent text of FED. R. EVID. 612.
76. FED. R. EVID. 612.

77. Wigmore, supra note 27, at 24.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol61/iss3/5
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Wigmore was not entirely off the mark. Since Rule 612 was enacted, a
certain amount of chaos has resulted-as revealed by the widely differing
results in the rule's application."
The Missouri Rule is easy to administer. "A witness need not produce
a document used to refresh recollection before testifying."79 The plain
meaning of this rule is obvious and is not open to discretionary application.
The only factual determination necessary under this rule is when the witness
refreshed his memory. If memory is refreshed while testifying, the document
is freely discoverable; if memory is refreshed prior to testifying, it is not.
Missouri's rule is fair and efficient. The Rule facilitates equal treatment
of refreshed recollection testimony in all cases. It limits lengthy discovery
"fishing expeditions," which are often delay tactics, and does not require
judicial resources to be spent on long investigations to determine what-in a
judge's discretion to avoid an injustice-should be disclosed.
One might argue that, in order to serve the interests of fairness, a judge
should have discretion over this area of discovery. However, when any
arbitrary rule is created, fairness is best served by equal application and strict
enforcement.
Since the rule stated in Polytech is merely a reiteration of the rule stated
in earlier Missouri Cases, a brief analysis of why the court of appeals strayed
from this rule, in Barrett,0 is warranted. The court of appeals relied on an
"implied" overruling of Missouri's rule, as interpreted from Callahan v.
Cardinal Glennon Hospital.8 In Callahan, the Missouri Supreme Court
stated that "no error or prejudice resulted" from a trial court requiring
disclosure of documents used to refresh recollection.82 The court of appeals
read this to be an "implied" overruling 8 3-which is not entirely unreasonable
when taken out of context. However, when read in context-found just after

78. Some courts give Rule 612 a broad reading; see Berkey Photo, Inc. v.
Eastman Kodak Co., 74 F.R.D. 613, 613-16 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). Other courts give Rule
612 a narrow reading, as in Dorderian v. Polaroid Corp., 121 F.R.D. 13 (D. Mass.
1988); and some follow a case by case standard, as in In re Joint Eastern & Southern
Dist. Asbestos Litig., 119 F.R.D 4 (E.D.N.Y. 1988). For other examples of
inconsistent application of Rule 612, see EDNA S. EPSTEIN & MICHAEL M. MARTIN,
THE ATORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND THE WORK-PRODUCT DOCTRINE 74-75, 158-

64 (2d ed. 1989); JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, 3 WEINsTEIN's

EVIDENCE 621-37 (1994); 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 34-35 (4th ed. 1992); Glen A.
Guarino, Annotation, Use of Writing to Refresh Witness' Memory, as Governed by
Rule 612 of FederalRules of Evidence, 73 A.L.R. FED. 423, 431, 438 (1985).

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Polylech, 895 S.W.2d at 14.
869 S.W.2d 282, 284 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994).
863 S.W.2d 852, 867 (Mo. 1993).
Id.
Barrett, 869 S.W.2d at 284-85.
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the statement that the Supreme Court should not interfere absent a manifest
abuse of discretion 8 4-- a more reasonable interpretation is that "no
[reversible]error or prejudice resulted." Though Callahanwas not as clearly
worded as it should have been, there was no discussion of Missouri's
refreshed recollection rule, and there was no implied overruling of the rule.8"
The Polytech decision is sound, well-reasoned, and concise. Had
Callahanbeen so carefully worded there would have been little possibility of
the Eastern District Court of Appeals straying from the traditional rule in
Barrett, requiring Polytech to be litigated. Missouri's best interests-in the
conservation of judicial resources, certainty, predictability and fairness-are
served when rules are clearly stated and strictly applied, as in this decision.
IV. CONCLUSION

Rules subject to discretionary imposition-especially regarding attorneyclient and work product privileges-effectivelycodify nothing, add uncertainty
to trial preparation, and are difficult for judges to administer with consistency.
In State ex rel. Polytech v. Voorhees, the Missouri Supreme Court reaffirmed
the traditional Missouri rule that a document used to refresh a witness's
memory prior to testifying need not be produced. By so doing, the court has
avoided the uncertainty that would inevitably accompany any purely case-bycase approach to the question of what disclosure is necessary in order to avoid
injustice.
MORRY COLE

84. Callahan, 863 S.W.2d at 867.
85. Polytech, 895 S.W.2d at 14.
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